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A CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR 




In the early summer of 2015, Marisol and her seven-year-old 
daughter Jennifer fled Honduras after a gang visited her home 
the second time.  The first time they came, they took away her 
sixteen-year-old son, Jaime.  She never saw Jaime alive again—
his body was discovered in a ravine just outside of town three 
days later.  Marisol believes Jaime was killed because he refused 
to join the gang.  The second time the gang came to Marisol’s 
home was to demand that she begin to pay “la renta”—an 
extortionary demand for payment—in exchange for 
“guaranteeing” her safety.  Marisol did not consider contacting 
the local police because she knew that the endemic corruption 
among Honduran law enforcement officials meant that she would 
either have to pay a bribe to have the police investigate her 
claims, or worse, the police would report to the gang that she had 
attempted to prosecute them and there would surely be 
retribution for her “treachery.”  Marisol faced a life-changing 
decision: try to keep up with payments to the gang with her 
paltry earnings from caring for her neighbors’ children or flee 
Honduras for the safety of the United States where her 
naturalized United States citizen sister resided.  Seeking a 
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better-paying job in order to earn enough to pay la renta seemed 
unlikely since Marisol, with only a fourth-grade education, was 
functionally illiterate.  Besides, there would be no one to care for 
Jennifer since Marisol’s husband had abandoned the family two 
years earlier.  Convinced that remaining in Honduras would 
result in her certain death at the hands of the gang, Marisol 
chose to travel the dangerous route northward to freedom from 
persecution. 
Three weeks later, Marisol crossed the United States border 
and turned herself into a U.S. Customs and Border Patrol officer. 
Marisol told the officer of her fear of death if she was returned to 
Honduras.  After a brief stay in the “icebox,” an interim holding 
facility with frigid temperatures designed to maximize the 
discomfort of noncitizens entering the country without 
documentation, Marisol and Jennifer were transferred to the 
family detention center in Karnes, Texas. 
While incarcerated, Marisol was interviewed by an asylum 
officer and found to have a credible fear of persecution if she and 
her daughter were returned to Honduras.  The asylum officer 
referred Marisol’s case to an immigration judge in San Antonio 
for a full hearing of her claim.  Yet, despite having established a 
prima facie case for her asylum claim, when Marisol appeared 
unrepresented in court for her bond hearing, the judge set her 
bond at $15,000—an impossibly high amount for a woman of 
such modest means.  Marisol and Jennifer remained incarcerated 
until a local nonprofit agency put her in touch with a team of pro 
bono attorneys who succeeded in having Marisol’s bond lowered 
to $3,000.  Marisol’s sister and her husband immediately paid the 
bond and secured her release from custodial detention.  Marisol 
was relatively fortunate—her stay at the Karnes facility was only 
ninety days, whereas other women she met there had been 
detained for over a year simply because they could not find a 
lawyer to help them. 
Even though Marisol was no longer incarcerated, her 
travails were far from over.  Her pro bono attorneys had made 
clear that their representation was for the limited purpose of 
securing her release on bond; after all, there were hundreds of 
women and children at Karnes who required immediate legal 
assistance to get out on bond.  Marisol would now have to find an 
attorney who would agree to represent her at no—or low—cost. 
The stakes could not be higher:  if Marisol was not successful at 
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her hearing before the immigration judge, she faced certain 
persecution upon her forced return to Honduras.  Despite all 
odds, Marisol began to contact nonprofit agencies, law school 
clinics, and other potential sources of representation because she 
knew that successfully navigating the notoriously complicated 
shoals of immigration law without an attorney was a nearly 
insurmountable task. 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the harsh nature of removal, the per se right of 
indigent defendants to appointed counsel generally does not 
extend to immigration proceedings.  Relatively recent case law 
establishing the categorical right to appointed counsel for 
mentally disabled immigrants in removal proceedings represents 
the singular foothold of civil Gideon in the immigration realm.1  
Notably, the basis for the favorable order in Franco-Gonzalez v. 
Holder was rooted in the finding that § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act required the appointment of counsel as a “reasonable 
accommodation.”2  By explicitly predicating its reasoning on the 
plaintiffs’ disability claims, the court did not address the 
plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, thereby “avoid[ing] reaching 
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding 
them.”3 
This Article argues that had the Franco-Gonzalez court 
evaluated the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims by applying the 
classic Mathews v. Eldridge4 due process balancing test 
supplemented by more recent United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, the Franco-Gonzalez court would have arrived at 
an identical conclusion regarding the categorical right to 
appointed counsel for individuals with mental disabilities.  This 
Article further argues that the legal rationales for the putative 
successful constitutional claim in Franco-Gonzalez can be used to 
extend civil Gideon to other classes of vulnerable immigrant 
groups in removal proceedings, including detained noncitizen 
women and children like Marisol and Jennifer. 
1 Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492, 
at *20 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). 
2 Id. at *3. 
3 Id. at *9 (quoting In re Joye, 578 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
4 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
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The scholarship to date that has highlighted the need for 
appointed counsel in immigration proceedings has generally not 
applied classic due process analysis in light of the additional 
conditions cited in Turner v. Rogers5—the Supreme Court’s most 
recent statement on the appropriate factors to be considered in a 
due process analysis.6  This Article elaborates on the analysis of 
those scholars who have argued that Turner provides a 
promising path for appointed counsel in removal proceedings by 
re-examining the landmark case Franco-Gonzalez in light of 
Turner and extending the analysis to other vulnerable groups.7 
Part I outlines the current statutory and constitutional 
contours of appointed counsel in immigration proceedings.  Part 
II applies the classic Mathews due process balancing test and the 
additional factors cited in Turner to demonstrate that the 
Franco-Gonzalez plaintiffs’ due process claims also merited the 
right to appointed counsel.  Part II also addresses several of the 
arguments opposing the appointment of counsel, specifically the 
presumed prohibitive cost of providing counsel and the 
potentially dilatory effect on the administration of justice.  Part 
III uses the same analytical framework to argue that a 
categorical right to appointed counsel exists for other vulnerable 
groups, including detained families. 
5 564 U.S. 431, 444–45 (2011). 
6 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent 
Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394 (2013); Soulmaz Taghavi, Montes-Lopez v. Holder: 
Applying Eldridge To Ensure a Per Se Right to Counsel for Indigent Immigrants in 
Removal Proceedings, 39 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 245 (2014); Nimrod Pitsker, 
Comment, Due Process for All: Applying Eldridge To Require Appointed Counsel for 
Asylum Seekers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 169 (2007). 
7 See Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to 
Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal 
Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 113 (2012); Daniel Curry, Note, The March 
Toward Justice: Assessing the Impact of Turner v. Rogers on Civil Access-to-Justice 
Reforms, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 487 (2012); Shane T. Devins, Comment, Using 
the Language of Turner v. Rogers To Advocate for a Right to Counsel in Immigration 
Removal Proceedings, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 893 (2013); Miguel A. Gradilla, Note, 
Making Rights Real: Effectuating the Due Process Rights of Particularly Vulnerable 
Immigrants in Removal Proceedings Through Administrative Mechanisms, 4 COLUM. 
J. RACE & L. 225 (2014).
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I. STATUTORY & CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR
APPOINTED COUNSEL 
An examination of the statutory and constitutional bases for 
the right to appointed counsel in immigration proceedings yields 
starkly different conclusions.  While there is little statutory basis 
for the right to an appointed attorney, a review of the evolution of 
claims grounded in constitutional arguments provides more 
promising results. 
A. Statutory Rights
With a limited exception, there exists no categorical right to
government-funded representation in removal proceedings. 
Section 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1362, establishes the statutory basis for an 
alien’s right to counsel: 
In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in 
any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any 
such removal proceedings, the person concerned shall have the 
privilege of being represented (at no expense to the 
Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such 
proceedings, as he shall choose.8 
While § 292 refers to the “privilege” of appointed counsel, it has 
been observed that “its title, legislative history, and regulations 
make clear that the INA in fact establishes a right.”9  This 
statutory right is clearly limited by the parenthetical language 
“(at no expense to the Government)”.  This limitation has been 
interpreted to mean that the government is not required to pay 
for legal representation in removal proceedings.10  Thus, while it 
8 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). 
9 Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in 
Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 113, 124 (2008) 
(footnotes omitted); see also Castro-O’Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigr. & 
Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987). 
10 El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Exec. Off. of Immigr. Rev., 959 F.2d 742, 749 
(9th Cir. 1991) (observing congressional intent not to pay for the alien’s 
representation); Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding 
that “the parenthetical in [§] 292 means only that the government has no obligation 
to appoint and pay for the representation of aliens in deportation proceedings”), 
overruled on other grounds by Rueda-Menicucci v. INS, 132 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 1997). 
920 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:915   
is generally accepted that a statutory right to counsel at the 
alien’s expense exists under § 292, no categorical right exists to 
counsel at the government’s expense.11 
Additional statutes describe heightened safeguards for the 
vulnerable populations of unaccompanied minor children and 
“mental incompetents” facing removal.  Yet, although these 
statutory provisions prescribe additional duties of the 
immigration judge to ensure a fair proceeding, they fall short of 
authorizing government-paid counsel.  For example, the William 
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008 (“TVPRA”) specifies additional safeguards for 
unaccompanied children that include specialized procedures 
relating to their screening at ports of entry, applications for 
political asylum, and their care and custody while under the 
supervision of the Office of Refugee Resettlement.12  However, 
with respect to their right to government-funded counsel, the 
TVPRA explicitly references the limiting language of § 292.13 
Similarly, for aliens who have been deemed mentally 
incompetent—like the Franco-Gonzalez plaintiffs—federal 
regulations provide for heightened procedural safeguards 
including, among other things, special rules regarding: (1) service 
of the Notice to Appear;14 (2) parties qualified to appear on the 
alien’s behalf;15 and (3) the immigration judge’s acceptance of an 
admission of removability.16  Notwithstanding these heightened 
procedural safeguards, none of the statutory provisions establish 
a categorical right to government-funded counsel for mentally 
incompetent aliens. 
11 That is not to say that the government is prohibited from paying for counsel. 
In Franco-Gonzalez, the Department of Justice unsuccessfully argued that the 
limiting language served as a bar to the use of federal funding. The court rejected 
the DOJ’s pinched construction and held that “the plain language of [§ 292] does not 
lend itself to the interpretation that it ‘prohibits the provision of counsel at 
government expense.’ ” Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 
2013 WL 3674492, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). 
12 See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008); see also 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2012); 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(b)(1) (West 2014). 
13 § 1232(c)(5). 
14 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (2016). 
15 Id. § 1240.4. 
16 Id. § 1240.10(c). 
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In fact, the only section of the INA that unequivocally 
establishes an alien’s per se right to counsel at government 
expense is INA § 504(c), which is limited to the removal of aliens 
appearing before the United States Alien Terrorist Removal 
Court (“ATRC”).  Section 504(c) provides: 
The alien shall have a right to be present at such hearing and to 
be represented by counsel.  Any alien financially unable to 
obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to 
represent the alien.  Such counsel shall be appointed by the 
judge pursuant to the plan for furnishing representation for any 
person financially unable to obtain adequate representation for 
the district in which the hearing is conducted . . . .17 
Notably, counsel has never been appointed at government 
expense under § 504(c) since the ATRC is not yet used.18  At least 
one author has argued that the ATRC has never met because the 
court’s reliance on secret evidence would be unlikely to survive 
constitutional scrutiny.19 
B. Constitutional Claims
In contrast to the absence of a statutory basis for appointed
counsel in removal proceedings, a claim rooted in constitutional 
arguments yields more promising results. 
The constitutional right to appointed counsel at government 
expense can arise under the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. 
However, citizens and noncitizens are not similarly situated in 
this context.  The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”20  In Gideon v. 
Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court interpreted this 
language to encompass the appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants in criminal prosecutions.21  At his trial for a felony 
charge of breaking and entering, Clarence Gideon requested and 
was denied appointed counsel.22  He was subsequently convicted 
17 8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(1) (2012). 
18 Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y 
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 551, 578 n.123 (2014). 
19 John Dorsett Niles, Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of the Alien Terrorist 
Removal Court, 57 DUKE L.J. 1833, 1836–37 (2008). 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
21 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
22 Id. at 336–37. 
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and sentenced to five years in the state prison.23  On appeal, the 
Court observed the “obvious truth” that “in our adversary system 
of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to 
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him.”24 
The precise contours of the Gideon Court’s seemingly 
expansive holding were subsequently established in Argersinger 
v. Hamlin25 and Scott v. Illinois.26  In Argersinger, the Court
broadened the right to appointed counsel to encompass nonfelony
prosecutions based on the reasoning that many of the protections
afforded by the Sixth Amendment are not categorically limited by
the felony/misdemeanor dichotomy.27  Seven years later in Scott,
the Court identified the outer limit of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel by holding that the appointment of counsel was only
required in cases that could result in actual incarceration.28
Importantly for the purposes of this Article, the right to
appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment post-Scott is
available to citizens and noncitizens alike in criminal
prosecutions involving potential incarceration.
Yet, notwithstanding the promise of Gideon, the Sixth 
Amendment is an infelicitous vehicle for providing noncitizens 
with appointed counsel in immigration court.  It is well 
established that a noncitizen has no right to appointed counsel in 
removal proceedings under the Sixth Amendment.  This result 
flows from the view that a removal proceeding “is a purely civil 
action to determine eligibility to remain in this country.”29  But 
predicating the eligibility for appointment of counsel on the 
classification of the proceedings as either civil or criminal ignores 
the collateral consequences of a conviction.  In his concurrence to 
23 Id. at 337. 
24 Id. at 344. 
25 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
26 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
27 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 28. One obvious exception here is the right to trial by 
jury. In this context, the Court differentiated the “different genealogy” of the right to 
trial by jury. Id. at 29. 
28 Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74. 
29 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); see also Negusie v. 
Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 526 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“This Court has long 
understood that an ‘order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.’ ” (quoting 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893))); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 
32, 39 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and 
severe for the alien, is not a punishment.” (citing Font Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730)). 
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Argersinger, Justice Powell presciently argued for a broader rule, 
noting that “[s]erious consequences also may result from 
convictions not punishable by imprisonment.”30  It was precisely 
this logic that provided the foundation for the Court’s opinion 
twenty-nine years later in Padilla v. Kentucky.31  Nonetheless, 
the current rule of law holds that noncitizens facing removal are 
“not at all similarly situated to a defendant in a federal criminal 
prosecution” and, therefore, fail to qualify for counsel at the 
Government’s expense.32 
In contrast, it has been settled that noncitizens have due 
process protections under the Fifth Amendment.33  The modern 
roots of this entitlement can be traced to the Supreme Court’s 
1903 opinion in Yamataya v. Fisher in which the Court stated 
that due process inhered in removal proceedings.34  In Ng Fung 
Ho v. White, Justice Brandeis underscored the importance of the 
liberty interest at stake in removal proceedings by 
acknowledging the drastic nature of removal and the potential 
for the loss “of all that makes life worth living.”35  Similarly, the 
Court recognized in Bridges v. Wixon that although removal is 
not a criminal proceeding, due process attached because the 
hardship that was likely to be visited on the noncitizen was 
“often as great if not greater than the imposition of a criminal 
sentence.”36 
Within this line of Supreme Court cases, it is critical to 
differentiate between noncitizens already present in the country, 
who are subject to removal proceedings, and those noncitizens 
seeking entry who are subject to exclusion.  The Chinese 
Exclusion Case established that as far as noncitizens outside the 
30 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 48 (Powell, J., concurring). 
31 559 U.S. 356 (2010); see John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The 
Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013); see infra notes 
142–143 and accompanying text. 
32 Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690–91 (2013). 
33 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (recognizing that the “Due 
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, 
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”). 
34 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903) (“[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be 
understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of 
a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles 
that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution.”). 
35 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
36 326 U.S. 135, 164 (1945). 
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country are concerned, Congress has an absolute right to 
exclude.37  Perhaps the bluntest statement regarding Congress’s 
plenary power with respect to noncitizens seeking entry was 
provided by Justice Minton:  “Whatever the procedure authorized 
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned.”38 
However, for noncitizens already physically present inside 
the United States, due process jurisprudence requires heightened 
procedural safeguards.39  The leading case examining the right to 
government-appointed counsel for physically present noncitizens 
in removal proceedings is Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS.40  Here, the 
court reviewed an immigration judge’s decision to order 
petitioner Aguilera-Enriquez, a lawful permanent resident, 
deported on the basis of a drug conviction.41  The issue raised on 
appeal was whether the indigent alien had the constitutional 
right to appointed counsel in his removal proceeding.  Drawing 
on the “fundamental fairness” due process test articulated in 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit held that “[t]he test for whether due process 
requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent alien is 
whether, in a given case, the assistance of counsel would be 
necessary to provide ‘fundamental fairness the touchstone of due 
process.’ ”42  Thus, while the court failed to recognize a 
categorical right to appointed counsel, it did instruct that 
appointment of counsel may be necessary where “an 
unrepresented indigent alien would require counsel to present 
his position adequately to an immigration judge.”43  Aguilera-
Enriquez’s appeal was ultimately unsuccessful because he failed 
to provide a substantive defense to the predicate drug charge for 
which he was deportable.44 
37 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). 
38 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
39 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“It is 
true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be 
expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness 
encompassed in due process of law.”). 
40 516 F.2d 565, 568–70 (6th Cir. 1975). 
41 Id. at 567. 
42 Id. at 568 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)). 
43 Id. at 568 n.3. 
44 Id. at 569 (“The lack of counsel before the Immigration Judge did not prevent 
full administrative consideration of his argument. Counsel could have obtained no 
different administrative result.”). 
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The individuated case-by-case approach explicitly identified 
in Gagnon, and ratified in the immigration realm by Aguilera-
Enriquez, has been adopted, with significant variations, by a 
number of sister circuits.  The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. 
Circuits have applied the “fundamental fairness” standard.45  
However, the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
employed a harmless error standard that inquires whether 
deficient procedural safeguards resulted in prejudice that likely 
impacted the results of the proceedings.46  These different 
approaches reflect sharply differing views of enforcing the Fifth 
Amendment’s protections.  On one hand, the circuits favoring the 
fundamental fairness standard ground their position in the view 
that the right to counsel is a fundamental right, thereby 
obviating the need to demonstrate prejudice.  On the other hand, 
circuits relying on the prejudice standard share the view that 
“because the point of providing noncitizens a right to counsel is to 
ensure a fair proceeding under the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause, a noncitizen should have to demonstrate that the 
denial of the right to counsel caused him or her substantial 
prejudice.”47  The resulting circuit split has raised the possibility 
that the Supreme Court may one day take up the issue.48 
To date, however, regardless of which individuated due 
process test is used, there has not been a single instance where 
under the prevailing case-by-case approach a constitutional right 
to appointed counsel has been found for noncitizens facing 
removal.49  This state of affairs gives rise to the commonsense 
observation that “it takes a lawyer to get a lawyer.”50  Thus, for 
45 See Leslie v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 611 F.3d 171, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 525 F.2d 1295, 1301 (7th Cir. 1975); Yiu Fong Cheung v. 
INS, 418 F.2d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
46 Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1990); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 
805–06 (5th Cir. 1986); Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1990); 
Rageevan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 151 F. App’x 751, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2005). 
47 Wade Thomas & Andrew Herink, Appealing Denials of Right To Counsel in 
Deportation Hearings: Do Noncitizens Have To Show Prejudice?, 90 NO. 14 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 831, 834 (2013). 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 1155 (7th ed. 2012); Johnson, supra note 6, at 
2402. 
50 See Kaufman, supra note 9, at 137 (“Perhaps this is unsurprising: it takes an 
attorney to identify the sorts of complex constitutional or statutory claims that only 
an attorney can ‘adequately’ present.”). 
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all practical purposes, it appears that the right to an 
individualized case-by-case assessment of the right to an 
attorney in removal proceedings “is effectively no right at all.”51 
II. DUE PROCESS MATHEWS TEST UPDATED FOR TURNER V.
ROGERS 
Recent case law expanding on the factors to be considered in 
assessing the sufficiency of procedural due process underscore 
the United States Supreme Court’s observation that due process 
jurisprudence can be expected to evolve over time.52  Until it was 
refined by the Court’s 2011 decision in Turner v. Rogers, the 
classic Mathews v. Eldridge due process analysis had been the 
standard since 1976 by which the protection of constitutional 
rights were measured.53  The Mathews test sets forth three 
factors to be evaluated: (1) the private interest of the individual 
that will be injured by the official action; (2) the risk of error 
through the procedures used and probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the 
Government’s interest and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would 
entail.54 
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court laid 
out the specific framework for the application of the Mathews 
factors in the context of appointed counsel.55  The Lassiter 
petitioner appealed the termination of her parental rights on the 
grounds that because she was indigent, she was entitled to the 
appointment of counsel under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.56  Relying in part on Gagnon, the Court 
held that there exists a “presumption that an indigent litigant 
51 Id. 
52 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20–21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (noting that “ ‘[d]ue process’ is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our 
law—the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social 
standards of a progressive society”). 
53 Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444 (2011) (“[W]e consequently determine the 
‘specific dictates of due process’ by examining the ‘distinct factors’ that this Court 
has previously found useful in deciding what specific safeguards the Constitution's 
Due Process Clause requires in order to make a civil proceeding fundamentally fair.” 
(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976))). 
54 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
55 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981). 
56 Id. at 24. 
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has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be 
deprived of his physical liberty.”57  It is against this presumption 
that the three Mathews factors must be balanced.58 
Despite the prevalence of the application of the Mathews 
test, with one notable categorical exception for legal permanent 
residents (“LPR”), immigration courts have routinely relied on 
outdated pre-Mathews tests to assess the constitutionality of 
court procedures.59  To the extent that the Mathews factors 
provide a potentially more expansive view of the individual 
personal liberty at stake, the reliance on pre-Mathews tests 
imposes a higher burden on the noncitizen.60  It was precisely 
this focus on the nature of the personal liberty interest at stake 
for a returning LPR that tipped the scales in Landon v. 
Plasencia.61  Plasencia, an LPR returning from a brief trip to 
Mexico, was detained at the border due to her involvement in an 
attempt to smuggle aliens across the border.62  At an exclusion 
hearing, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 
denied Plasencia’s admission to the United States.  Plaintiff 
Plasencia appealed the INS decision on the basis that, among 
other things, she was impermissibly denied due process 
protections, including adequate notice, appropriate burden of 
proof, and an informed waiver of her right to representation. 
Subsequent to affirmance by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court remanded on the basis 
that the Mathews test was the appropriate standard to assess 
whether Plasencia had been afforded due process and the factors 
relevant to the due process analysis had not been adequately 
developed in the prior proceedings.63 
57 Id. at 26–27. 
58 Id. at 27. 
59 See Rageevan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 151 F. App’x 751, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1990); Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 
467 (10th Cir. 1990); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 805–06 (5th Cir. 1986). 
60 Taghavi, supra note 6, at 254 (“[I]t is extraordinarily difficult to demonstrate 
that a judge, who has discretionary review, would have decided the case differently 
had there been counsel and potential alternative arguments or forms of relief 
asserted.”). 
61 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
62 Id. at 23. 
63 Id. at 34, 37 (“[T]he courts must consider the interest at stake for the 
individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the 
procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or different procedural 
safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current procedures 
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The tenor of Justice O’Connor’s opinion may have presaged 
the court’s view on the likely outcome of application of the 
Mathews factors to Plasencia’s circumstances.  Writing for the 
majority, Justice O’Connor noted:  “Plasencia’s interest here is, 
without question, a weighty one.  She stands to lose the right ‘to 
stay and live and work in this land of freedom.’  Further, she may 
lose the right to rejoin her immediate family, a right that ranks 
high among the interests of the individual.”64 
The government subsequently declined further prosecution 
of Plasencia on remand—presumably due to the likelihood that 
pro-immigrant due process law would arise from further 
litigation of the case.65 
Plasencia is generally understood to stand for the proposition 
that LPRs in removal proceedings should be afforded the 
Mathews due process analytical framework.66  However, no court 
has declared that Mathews is inapplicable to non-LPR aliens.67  
The counterargument has been advanced that LPRs are in a 
sense more deserving of appointed counsel because their 
interests at stake are “especially high.”68  Yet, the “weighty” 
interest referred to by Justice O’Connor is equally applicable to 
non-LPRs—especially those who were brought to this country as 
children—who would face the same risk of losing the “right to 
stay and live and work” as well as the “right to rejoin [his or] her 
immediate family.”69  After Plasencia, LPRs currently stand as 
the only immigrant subgroup categorically determined to benefit 
from application of the more expansive Mathews factors. 
rather than additional or different procedures.” (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976))). 
64 Id. at 34 (citation omitted). 
65 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 49, at 560. 
66 It has been noted elsewhere that the Plasencia Court for the first time framed 
the inquiry regarding the treatment of returning LPRs in constitutional, not 
regulatory, terms. See Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A 
Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L. REV. 879, 905 (2015). Previous Supreme Court 
cases had avoided the constitutional implications by “assimilating” the foreign 
nationals’ status to that of a continually present immigrant. Id.; see also Rosenberg 
v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 459–60 (1963); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,
596 (1953).
67 Pitsker, supra note 6, at 177. 
68 See generally Johnson, supra note 6, at 2405 (alluding to the concomitant 
statutory benefits accruing to LPRs (for example, the right to remain indefinitely, 
the right to naturalize, and particular forms of relief from removal)). 
69 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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For non-LPR aliens in removal proceedings, Mathews is 
rarely applied.  Outmoded pre-Mathews due process analytical 
frameworks—no prejudice and harmless error tests—continue to 
be employed in most circuit courts without the rigorous balancing 
of Mathews factors.70  There are, however, notable instances 
where the Mathews framework has been applied to a non-LPR in 
removal proceedings.  In Ching v. Mayorkas, the Ninth Circuit 
evaluated the case of a non-LPR who claimed that her procedural 
due process rights were violated during USCIS’s adjudication of 
her husband’s visa petition for immediate relative status on her 
behalf.71  The crux of her argument was that USCIS relied on 
statements from third parties without providing her the 
opportunity for cross examination in the face of contradictory 
documents and affidavits.72  As the court explained, “[i]n almost 
every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, 
due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses.”73  The court determined that 
USCIS’s invasion of Ching’s right to confront implicated a 
property interest and that “[t]he proper analysis to determine 
whether additional process was due in this case is provided in 
Mathews.”74 
Notwithstanding the circuit courts’ reluctance to consistently 
apply the Mathews factors in the immigration due process 
context, the Supreme Court’s most recent foray into due process 
jurisprudence, Turner v. Rogers, has breathed new life into the 
argument that appointed counsel is constitutionally required in 
removal proceedings. 
Turner was held in civil contempt after he repeatedly failed 
to make court-ordered payments to respondent Rogers to help 
support their child.75  On the first four occasions, he was 
sentenced to ninety days’ imprisonment, but he eventually paid 
the outstanding amounts.76  The fifth time, he completed a 180-
70 See Rageevan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 151 F. App’x 751, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1990); Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 
467 (10th Cir. 1990); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 805–06 (5th Cir. 1986). 
71 725 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2013). 
72 Id. at 1156. 
73 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 
(1970)). 
74 Id. at 1157. 
75 Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 436–37 (2011). 
76 Id. at 436. 
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day sentence but still did not pay the amount he owed.  Turner 
was subsequently charged with contempt in his sixth court 
appearance.77  Neither Turner nor Rogers were represented by 
counsel at any of the contempt hearings.78  At the sixth hearing, 
the family court judge found Turner in willful contempt and 
sentenced him to twelve months in prison without making any 
finding as to his ability to pay.79  After Turner completed his 
sentence, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected his claim 
that he was constitutionally entitled to counsel at the contempt 
hearing, concluding that civil contempt does not require all the 
constitutional safeguards applicable in criminal contempt 
proceedings.80  The United States Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded the decision.81 
The Court preliminarily addressed the issue of whether 
Turner had a right to appointed counsel by noting that it had 
previously “found a right to counsel ‘only’ in cases involving 
incarceration, not that a right to counsel exists in all such 
cases.”82  Not having found a categorical right to counsel, the 
Court next turned to the Mathews balancing test to weigh the 
“distinct factors” necessary to determine what procedural 
safeguards were needed to make the proceedings fundamentally 
fair.83  In assessing the first factor, the Court found that the 
private interest to be affected “argue[d] strongly for the right to 
counsel.”84  The Court also found that the second factor, the risk 
of erroneous deprivation, supported the appointment of counsel 
inasmuch as the “failure of trial courts to make a determination 
of a contemnor’s ability to comply is not altogether infrequent.”85  
Here, the Court noted that the ability to pay constitutes a 
“dividing line” between civil and criminal contempt inasmuch as 
a civil contemnor can avoid or purge the sentence, whereas a 
criminal contemnor must serve the sentence regardless of later 
compliance with the court order.86  An incorrect decision that 
77 Id. at 436–37. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 437. 
80 Id. at 438. 
81 Id. at 449. 
82 Id. at 443. 
83 Id. at 444. 
84 Id. at 445. 
85 Id. at 446 (quoting McBride v McBride, 334 N.C. 124, 131, n.4 (1993)). 
86 Id. 445. 
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wrongly classifies the contempt proceeding as civil deprives the 
defendant of the procedural protections, including appointed 
counsel, which would inhere if the proceedings were classified as 
criminal.87 
In deciding against Turner’s right to appointed counsel, the 
Court found the probable value of “additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards” to be outcome-determinative.88  The Court 
identified three related considerations that militated against the 
appointment of counsel.  First, determination of the ability-to-
pay was relatively straightforward—thus diminishing the need 
for counsel.89  Second, the opposing party in child support cases is 
also regularly unrepresented and consequently the appointment 
of counsel to the noncustodial parent would create “an 
asymmetry of representation” that could make the proceeding 
less fair overall.90  The third consideration was that there existed 
an alternative set of procedural safeguards that could 
significantly reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty. 
The Court identified these additional safeguards as: (1) notifying 
the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in the 
contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form to elicit the 
defendant’s relevant financial information; (3) an opportunity at 
the hearing for the defendant to address his financial status; and 
(4) an express determination by the court of the defendant’s
ability to pay.91
The Court concluded that the family court judge failed to 
substantively adhere to the additional safeguards that were 
necessary to make Turner’s civil contempt proceeding 
fundamentally fair.92  Consequently, the contempt proceeding 
violated due process and the lower court’s decision was vacated 
and remanded for additional fact gathering in compliance with 
the ignored safeguards.93 
On its face, the language in Turner that the Due Process 
Clause “does not automatically require”94 the appointment of 
counsel at a civil contempt hearing to an indigent individual 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 446 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 447. 
91 Id. at 447–48. 
92 Id. at 449. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 448. 
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facing incarceration appears to limit the prospects for civil 
Gideon in the immigration context.  However, the Court’s 
decision provides a promising path for the establishment of a 
categorical right to appointed counsel for certain vulnerable 
groups in removal proceedings.  The Turner Court expressly 
limited its holding to proceedings where the opposing party is not 
represented by counsel and where the case at hand is not 
unusually complex.95  These two conditions—asymmetrical legal 
representation and the complex nature of the case—which serve 
to limit the central holding in Turner, are the hallmarks of 
immigration court proceedings. 
A. Asymmetrical Legal Representation in Immigration
Proceedings
Unlike the equipoise posture contemplated by the decision in
Turner, there exists a structural asymmetry in legal 
representation in immigration proceedings that produces stark 
disparities in legal outcomes. 
It is axiomatic that the government is represented by counsel 
at all times in the removal hearings.  It falls to attorneys within 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), an agency 
operating within the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), 
to prosecute the government’s case.  As of November 2014, there 
were almost 1,000 ICE attorneys assigned to immigration 
enforcement and prosecution.96  This level of attorney staffing 
represents a sharp increase from the 600 ICE attorneys 
employed in May 200497 and reflects the heightened priority 
placed on removals under the Obama Administration.98 
In contrast to the constant presence of government counsel 
in removal proceedings, EOIR data indicates that only slightly 
more than half of the individuals haled before an immigration 
95 Id. at 448–49. 
96 Complaint at 3, Vroom v. Johnson, No. CV-14-02463-PHX-JAT, 2015 WL 
3490086 (D. Ariz., June 3, 2015). 
97 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., DHS IMMIGRATION ATTORNEYS: 
WORKLOAD ANALYSIS AND WORKFORCE PLANNING EFFORTS LACK DATA AND 
DOCUMENTATION 9 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07206.pdf. 
98 The Obama Administration deported an average of 400,000 individuals 
between 2005 and 2013, representing a sixty percent increase over the 250,000 
annual average under the Bush Administration. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2013 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 103 (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2013_0.pdf. 
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court in 2014 were represented.99  The meager fifty-five percent 
representation rate, nonetheless, represents a significant 
improvement from the average thirty-eight percent rate recorded 
by EOIR from 2005 through 2009.100  The reported increase in the 
rate of representation has led at least one commentator to 
conclude that the percentage of noncitizens appearing with 
counsel has improved in recent years.101  However, the apparent 
increase in representation rates is more likely explained by a 
change in EOIR’s calculation methodology that expanded the 
number of persons classified as represented by simply changing 
the definition of “represented.”102 
Another explanation for the apparent increase in the rate of 
representation—to the still anemic fifty-five percent rate 
recorded in 2014—may be related to the type of representation 
being provided.  Under the current statutes, an individual in 
removal proceeding may be represented by an attorney, a law 
student whose appearance is supervised by an attorney, an 
“accredited representative[],” or a “reputable individual[].”103  
99 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2014 STATISTICS YEARBOOK F1 (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf. 
100 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2009 STATISTICS YEARBOOK G1 (2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2010/03/04/fy09syb.pdf. 
101 COLUM. L. SCH. HUM. RIGHTS INST., EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ENSURING 
MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES, INCLUDING IMMIGRATION 
PROCEEDINGS 5 (2014), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/ 
human-rights-institute/files/equal_access_to_justice_-_cerd_shadow_report.pdf. 
102 Prior to 2011, EOIR determined representation rates by looking at whether a 
noncitizen had counsel at a particular proceeding. In 2011, the new methodology 
classified an individual as represented if he or she was represented at any point in a 
particular case. To illustrate, if a person appeared without counsel in 2007 but later 
appeared with counsel in 2009, he or she would have been classified as 
“unrepresented” in 2007 and “represented” in 2008. Under the new methodology, the 
same individual would have been classified as “represented” in both years. See Joan 
Friedland, Falling Through the Cracks: How Gaps in ICE’s Prosecutorial Discretion 
Policies Affect Immigrants Without Legal Representation, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 9 
n.1 (May 2012), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/re
search/friedland_-_unrepresented_immigrants_051412.pdf.
103 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a) (2016). An “accredited representative” is a nonprofit 
religious, charitable, or social organization that provides its services free of charge 
and has been designated by the Board of Immigration Appeals to have adequate 
knowledge and experience to practice in immigration court. Id. § 1292.2(a). A 
“reputable individual” is a person of good moral character, appearing at the request 
of the individual seeking representation, without seeking remuneration, and has a 
pre-existing relationship with the individual seeking representation—for example, 
as a relative, neighbor, clergy, or personal friend. § 1292.1(a)(3). The pre-existing 
relationship requirement may be waived where representation would not otherwise 
be available. Id. 
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Thus, a portion of the overall rate of representation reported by 
EOIR may be due to an increase in the rate of nonattorney 
representation—for example, representation by a law student, 
accredited representative, or reputable individual. 
Importantly, aggregated representation statistics mask large 
disparities in representation rates among immigrant subgroups. 
For instance, in 2007 nearly sixty percent of noncitizens in 
immigration proceedings were unrepresented.  However, among 
the subgroup of detained noncitizens, a staggering eighty-four 
percent went to court without representation.104 
The asymmetry in legal representation is significant because 
having a lawyer has a profound impact on the likelihood of 
success in immigration proceedings.  A study of New York State 
noncitizens appearing in immigration court found that those with 
representation were almost six times more likely to have a 
successful outcome than unrepresented immigrants.105  Similarly, 
EOIR data indicates that asylum seekers with legal 
representation were nearly five times more likely to be granted 
asylum.106  Again, aggregation masks striking differences in legal 
outcomes.  Among the immigrant subgroup of asylum seekers in 
expedited removal,107 asylum seekers without a lawyer have been 
found more than 12.5 times less likely to be granted asylum.108  
Admittedly, there exists the possibility of “selection bias”—that 
104 Nina Siulic et al., Improving Efficiency and Promoting Justice in the 
Immigration System: Lessons from the Legal Orientation Program, VERA INST. OF 
JUST. (May 2008), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/LOP_ 
Evaluation_May2008_final.pdf. 
105 Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Immigration 
Proceedings, N.Y. IMMGR. REPRESENTATION STUDY 20 (Dec. 2011), https://www.ils. 
ny.gov/files/Accessing%20Justice.pdf. 
106 Asylum Denial Rate Reaches All Time Low: FY 2010 Results, a Twenty-Five 
Year Perspective, TRAC IMMIGR. (Sept. 2, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/ 
reports/240. 
107 “Expedited Removal” is the process that DHS uses to remove people from the 
U.S. who attempt to enter the country without proper documentation. If an 
immigration officer determines that a noncitizen is inadmissible, the officer shall 
order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review 
unless the noncitizen indicates either an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of 
persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
108 Over the period from 2000 to 2004, asylum seekers without a lawyer had a 
two-percent chance of being granted asylum while those with an attorney had a 
twenty-five-perent chance of being granted asylum. See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 4 
(2005), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/ 
Volume_I.pdf. 
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is, attorneys take only the most winnable cases—however, the 
striking size of the disparity in legal outcomes strongly suggests 
that the absence of counsel is a determining factor in whether a 
noncitizen will be removed. 
Thus, in immigration proceedings, not only does there exist 
an asymmetry in legal representation, thereby meeting the first 
limiting condition of Turner, the impact of the imbalance in 
representation significantly affects legal outcomes. 
B. The Unusually Complex Nature of Immigration Law
Nor is the second condition circumscribing the Turner
decision—that the case at hand not be “unusually complex”—
fulfilled in the case of immigration proceedings.  In fact, the 
sharp differences in outcomes that arise because of the 
asymmetry in legal representation are in large part due to the 
unusually complex nature of immigration law. 
The opacity of immigration law arises from the piecemeal 
manner in which the INA has been amended.  Since its initial 
passage in 1952, periodic changes to the statutory schema, 
including major revisions in 1986, 1990, and 1996, have resulted 
in the gradual accumulation of increasing layers of complexity. 
The end result is a body of law that is a “baffling skein of 
provisions,”109 where “plain words do not always mean what they 
say”110 and “morsels of comprehension must be pried from 
mollusks of jargon.”111 
Further complicating the situation, several agencies—U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
and the Department of Justice—and judicial bodies—Executive 
Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals, 
and federal district and circuit courts—interpret the INA, 
resulting in inconsistent interpretations and frequent circuit 
splits. 
109 Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977). 
110 Yuen Sang Low v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 479 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1973). 
111 Dong Sik Kwon v. INS, 646 F.2d 909, 919 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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As a result of the “labyrinthine character”112 of modern 
immigration law, unrepresented immigrants are profoundly 
prejudiced in presenting their cases in immigration court.  Even 
trained legal advocates may not be up to the task.  As a 
consequence of Padilla v. Kentucky,113 holding that a criminal 
defense lawyer is obligated to advise noncitizen clients of the 
collateral immigration consequences of a guilty plea, the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) advises practicing criminal 
law attorneys to establish relationships with immigration law 
experts and refer clients to them when the consequences of a plea 
deal on immigration status are unclear.114 
The prejudice to the unrepresented immigrant arising from 
the adiaphanous nature of immigration law extends beyond the 
immigration courtroom.  A noncitizen who appears pro se is also 
disadvantaged in seeking administrative forms of relief from the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). 
Following DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson’s November 2014 
directive, ICE attorneys were instructed to prioritize and focus 
their removal efforts with the intent that those cases that did not 
meet agency priorities would be suspended in an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.115  Discretionary case closure data 
indicate, however, that in practice, while some ICE attorneys 
“take seriously the responsibility of equitable prosecutorial 
discretion, others seem to regard it as optional or nonexistent.”116  
Consequently, the daunting challenge for noncitizens appearing 
pro se is to decipher how to request a favorable exercise of 
discretion and to fully appreciate what exactly an offer of 
prosecutorial discretion entails.  Unrepresented individuals are 
112 Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that the body of 
immigration law is “a maze of hyper-technical statutes and regulations that 
engender waste, delay, and confusion”). 
113 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
114 Maggie Arias & Benjamin Waxman, Practice Tips & Ethics for Criminal 
Defense Attorneys Representing Noncitizen Clients, A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. NEWSL. 
6 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_jus 
tice_section_newsletter/arias_waxman_fall2012.authcheckdam.pdf. 
115 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, et al. 
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_ 
prosecutorial_discretion.pdf. 
116 Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal 
Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2014) (citing data that suggests significant 
disparities in the rate of grants of prosecutorial discretion between courts with 
similarly sized dockets). 
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unlikely to have the expertise to successfully navigate the highly 
formalistic process by making their request at the appropriate 
time, in the necessary format, and with a sufficient level of a 
documentation to survive a denial of discretion.  Inasmuch as 
discretionary decisions made by immigration authorities are 
effectively unreviewable, the denial of an insufficiently detailed 
request for prosecutorial discretion can have irremediably lasting 
consequences.117 
An individual lacking immigration counsel is also likely to be 
unaware of the significant implications of a grant of prosecutorial 
discretion.  Administrative closure—a “procedural convenience 
that authorizes the temporary removal of proceedings from the 
[c]ourt’s calendar while retaining the proceedings on the [c]ourt’s
docket”118—is the primary mechanism through which a favorable
grant of prosecutorial discretion has been granted.119  However,
since a case in administrative closure is not terminated but
merely placed on hold, the right to vindicate a claim for relief is
similarly suspended.  Noncitizens who benefit from
administrative closure are generally not eligible for a work
permit—an employment authorization document (“EAD”) in
immigration parlance—unless they have an independent basis
for the EAD.120  Further, recipients of administrative closure are
ineligible to recover bond money posted to secure their return.121
Consequently, an individual who has a strong legal claim for
relief would be ill advised to accept an offer of administrative
closure.  Without a complete understanding of the benefits and
potentially significant disadvantages of a grant of prosecutorial
discretion, an unrepresented individual is prejudiced in making
an informed decision about case strategy.
117 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (stating that “no court shall have 
jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action . . . which is specified under 
this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of 
Homeland Security”). 
118 US CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: USCIS–AILA 
MEETING 11 (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/ 
Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/2012/October%202012/AILA-Liaison-
Committee-meetingQA.pdf. 
119 Prosecutorial Discretion Implementation: Synthesis of Chapter Reports, AILA 
6 (Jan. 31, 2012), https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/January%2031,%202012%2 
0AILA%20Synthesis%20of%20Chapter%20Rep.pdf. 
120 Id. at 7. 
121 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB NO. 1653-0022, IMMIGRATION BOND, 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2016/i352.pdf. 
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Thus, in the context of Turner’s second limiting condition—
the relative complexity of the body of law at issue—the 
appointment of counsel in immigration proceedings is necessary 
to ensure adequate due process. 
C. Applying Mathews and Turner Factors to Franco-Gonzalez v.
Holder
Jose Antonio Franco-Gonzalez was the named plaintiff in a
class action suit filed on August 2, 2010.122  At the time, Mr. 
Franco-Gonzalez was a twenty-nine-year-old native and citizen of 
Mexico.  His parents were both lawful permanent residents of the 
United States.  Mr. Franco-Gonzalez was one of eleven siblings 
who lived in the U.S.  All of the Franco-Gonzalez siblings who 
resided in the U.S. had, or were in the process of obtaining, legal 
status at the time of the complaint:  Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s three 
eldest brothers were U.S. citizens; two of his sisters were lawful 
permanent residents; and Mr. Franco-Gonzalez and five of his 
siblings had pending family petitions for adjustment of status to 
law permanent resident.123 
Mr. Franco-Gonzalez had a documented diagnosis of 
“moderate mental retardation,” indicating an IQ level in the 
range of thirty-five to fifty-five.  His cognitive development was 
atypical: he was unable to speak until the age of six or seven.  At 
the time of the complaint, he was unable to tell time, had 
difficulty identifying numbers and counting, and did not know 
his own birthday or age.  Psychological reports estimated his 
cognitive functionality at the level of a two-year-old.124 
He was arrested in April 2004 and accused of throwing a 
rock during a fight between two gangs.  Mr. Franco-Gonzalez 
pleaded guilty to an aggravated felony—assault with a deadly 
weapon—spent a year in jail and then was transferred to 
immigration custody for removal proceedings in April 2005.  A 
court-ordered psychiatric evaluation concluded that Franco-
Gonzalez “did not understand the nature of his removal 
122 Third Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at ¶ 11, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 
10-2211 DMG (DTB), 2011 WL 12677104 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011).
123 Id. ¶ 32.
124 Id.
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proceedings.”125  Having been deemed incompetent to represent 
himself, an immigration judge ordered the administrative closure 
of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s case in June 2005.  Yet, Mr. Franco-
Gonzalez remained detained for almost four-and-a-half more 
years, despite the fact that there were no open removal 
proceedings against him.  It was the government’s position that 
Mr. Franco-Gonzalez fell into the category of noncitizens who are 
mandatorily detained based on their conviction of an aggravated 
felony pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).126 
In December 2009, DHS moved to end the period of 
administrative closure and reinstate removal proceedings.  In 
March 2010, after nearly five years in immigration custody, Mr. 
Franco-Gonzalez with the assistance of pro bono counsel filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Four days after filing the 
writ, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez was released from detention subject to 
electronic monitoring pending a merits hearing on his case. 
In August 2010, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez filed a class action 
complaint on behalf of a class of similarly situated plaintiffs.127  
After several amendments, the class was eventually certified in 
November 2011 and consisted of: 
All individuals who are or will be in DHS custody for removal 
proceedings in California, Arizona, and Washington who have 
been identified by or to medical personnel, DHS, or an 
Immigration Judge, as having a serious mental disorder or 
defect that may render them incompetent to represent 
themselves in detention or removal proceedings, and who 
presently lack counsel in their detention or removal 
proceedings.128 
The final amended complaint alleged causes of action rooted in 
alleging various violations of the INA, the Due Process Clause, 
the Administrative Procedures Act, and § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act.129 
125 Gonzalez v. United States, No. CV-12-01912 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 942363, 
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013). 
126 Id. at *3. 
127 Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 
3674492, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). 
128 Id. at *2. 
129 Id. (“The third amended complaint allege[d] the following causes of action: 
(1) right to a competency evaluation under the INA; (2) right to a competency
evaluation under the Due Process Clause; (3) right to appointed counsel under the
INA; (4) right to appointed counsel under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
794 (“§ 504”); (5) right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause; (6) right
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The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California issued a permanent injunction in April 2013 ordering 
that legal representation through a qualified representative must 
be provided to immigrant detainees with mental disabilities who 
are facing removal and who are unable to represent themselves 
in immigration court.130  The court defined “qualified 
representative” as an attorney, a law student or law graduate 
directly supervised by a retained attorney, or an accredited 
representative.131 
Importantly, the court found the basis for the plaintiffs’ relief 
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by deciding that the 
plaintiffs were unable to meaningfully access the immigration 
court.132  In an exercise of constitutional avoidance, the court 
found that it was not necessary to reach the constitutional 
dimensions of the plaintiffs’ claim.133 
The following subsections will apply the Mathews factors and 
Turner conditions to Franco-Gonzalez to demonstrate that, had 
the constitutional claims been considered, the same order for 
legal representation would have resulted. 
1. Mathews Factor No. 1: The Nature of the Private Interest at
Stake
The applicability of the dominant Mathews test in the
context of immigration proceedings was established in Plasencia.  
The Court used the familiar language of Mathews to frame its 
analysis of plaintiff Plasencia’s claim.134  Although Plasencia was 
an LPR, no court has stated that application of the Mathews due  
to release under the INA; (7) right to release under the Due Process Clause; (8) right 
to a detention hearing under the INA; (9) right to a detention hearing under [§] 504; 
(10) right to a detention hearing under the Due Process Clause; and (11) violation of
the Administrative Procedures Act.”) Id.
130 Id. at *16. 
131 Id. at *5. 
132 Id. (“[F]inding that [§] 504 is not limited to intentional discrimination alone, 
but ‘requires that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided 
with meaningful access to the benefit’ ” (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 
301 (1985))). 
133 Id. at *9. 
134 See supra Part II. 
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process test is inappropriate for non-LPR aliens.135  Indeed, 
Plasencia makes no distinction regarding the immigration status 
of the noncitizen.136 
Similar to Ching v. Mayorkas,137 wherein the Ninth Circuit 
used the Mathews framework in the case of a non-LPR to 
evaluate a due process deprivation arising from the lack of 
opportunity to confront, the invasion of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s 
right to confront also required a Mathews analysis.  The 
government argued that Mr. Gonzalez fell into the category of 
noncitizens who are mandatorily detained under 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).  Ordinarily, individuals who find themselves 
subject to mandatory detention have the right to a Joseph 
hearing where an immigration judge will determine whether the 
individual is properly classified within the group for whom 
mandatory detention is obligatory.138  Here, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez 
was placed in immigration detention after pleading guilty to an 
aggravated felony, but he never attended a Joseph hearing before 
an immigration judge to determine whether his detention was 
mandatory under § 1226(c).  Thus, the court found that Mr. 
Franco-Gonzalez “had no opportunity to present evidence or 
argument that he was not properly included in the mandatory 
detention category and his detention never became ‘mandatory’ 
under [§] 1226(c).”139  This deprivation is nearly identical to the 
issue at hand in Ching, which utilized the Mathews test for a 
non-LPR. 
Regarding the nature of the interest at stake, it is instructive 
to recall Justice O’Connor’s language in Plasencia that the 
private liberty interest for individuals in removal proceedings “is, 
135 See id. 
136 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (“In evaluating the [sufficiency of 
due process] procedures in any case, the courts must consider the interest at stake 
for the individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the 
procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or different procedural 
safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current procedures 
rather than additional or different procedures.”). 
137 725 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2013). 
138 In Joseph, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that an alien is “properly 
included in a mandatory detention category only when an Immigration Judge is 
convinced that the Service is substantially unlikely to establish, at the merits 
hearing, the charge or charges that subject the alien to mandatory detention.” 22 I. 
& N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A. 1999). 
139 Gonzalez v. United States, No. CV-12-01912 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 942363, 
at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013). 
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without question, a weighty one.”140  Like the plaintiff Plasencia, 
Mr. Franco-Gonzalez risked losing the “right to stay and live and 
work in the United States” and “the right to rejoin [his] 
immediate family.”141  This deprivation was also at the heart of 
Padilla v. Kentucky, wherein the Court elided the distinction 
between direct and collateral consequences of a criminal 
conviction—recognizing that “[o]ur law has enmeshed criminal 
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a 
century.”142  Even before Padilla, the Court recognized that 
“[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States 
may be more important to the client than any potential jail 
sentence.”143 
Beyond a general liberty interest, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez 
possessed additional compelling private interests.  His prolonged 
imprisonment after the administrative close of his case 
implicated his constitutionally protected interest in avoiding 
detention.  In Zadvydas, the Court explained:  “[G]overnment 
detention violates [the Due Process] Clause unless the detention 
is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural 
protections, or, in certain special and ‘narrow’ non-punitive 
‘circumstances,’ where a special justification, such as harm-
threatening mental illness, outweighs the ‘individual’s 
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical 
restraint.’ ”144 
The detention at issue in Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s case was 
clearly civil inasmuch as he had completed his one-year jail 
sentence before being transferred to ICE custody.  The relevant 
inquiry then is whether a sufficient “special justification” existed 
for his continued imprisonment.  Mr. Franco-Gonzalez was 
convicted of assault with a deadly nonfirearm weapon for his role 
in a rock-throwing incident between two gangs.  In Demore v. 
Hyung Joon Kim, the Court upheld mandatory detention of 
noncitizens in removal proceedings who had committed certain 
criminal acts including the act for which Mr. Franco-Gonzalez 
was convicted.145  The Demore holding, however, does not govern 
140 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34. 
141 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
142 559 U.S. 356, 365–66 (2010). 
143 INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) (quoting 3 Bender, Criminal 
Defense Techniques §§ 60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999)). 
144 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citations omitted). 
145 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). 
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Mr. Franco-Gonzalez because his removal proceeding was 
administratively closed and he had no open removal proceedings 
against him while he was detained for almost five years.  Mr. 
Franco-Gonzalez’s circumstances fall closer to the ambit of 
Zadvydas, which addressed the question of indefinite detention 
after removal proceedings had been concluded or terminated. 
The Zadvydas court found that the public safety justification for 
indefinite detention was “weak or nonexistent where removal 
seems a remote possibility.”146  To the extent that Mr. Franco-
Gonzalez’s profound cognitive deficiencies were unlikely to 
improve and he had been unable to enlist the services of an 
attorney while he was detained, removal was a “remote 
possibility” for him.  Thus, under Zadvydas, the continued 
detention was a violation of Mr. Gonzalez’s constitutionally 
protected interest in avoiding physical restraint. 
2. Mathews Factor No. 2: Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second Mathews factor—the risk of erroneous
deprivation through the procedures used and probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards—also 
supported the appointment of counsel for Mr. Franco-Gonzalez. 
At the time of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s claim, the detention of 
noncitizens with mental disabilities was not altogether 
infrequent.  Although there are no regular procedures used by 
DHS or ICE to identify the number of detainees who have mental 
disabilities, ICE estimated that in 2008 between two percent and 
five percent of all immigration detainees possessed a “serious 
mental illness.”147  In 2010—the year of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s 
class action complaint—ICE detained approximately 363,000 
foreign nationals.148  Assuming that the rate of mental illness did 
not change appreciably between 2008 and 2010, approximately 
7,300 to 18,200 detainees had a serious and persistent mental 
disability at the time of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s initial complaint. 
By 2013, due to the uptick in detentions under the Obama 
146 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 
147 Third Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at ¶ 25, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 
10-2211 DMG (DTB), 2011 WL 12677104 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011).
148 Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2010, 2011 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
ANN. REP. 1, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-
ar-2010.pdf. 
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Administration, between 8,800 and 22,100 detainees were 
mentally disabled, thus supporting the contention that the risk of 
erroneous deprivation is not infrequent.149 
Moreover, the risk of erroneous deprivation is enhanced due 
to the nature of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s disability.  His cognitive 
deficiencies significantly impeded his ability to represent himself. 
With his limited intellect, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez would be unable 
to understand documents, including the Notice to Appear related 
to his removal proceedings.150  In the event he successfully 
navigated himself to the hearing on time, his mental disability 
would play a role in increasing his risk of an erroneous ruling 
since individuals with low intellectual acuity are often 
excessively deferential to adult authority and unwilling or unable 
to assert themselves in a forceful manner. 
The Franco-Gonzalez court explicitly addressed the 
inadequacy of procedural safeguards to prevent erroneous 
deprivation for incompetent noncitizens in immigration 
proceedings.  The court evaluated the precedential decision 
issued by the B.I.A. in Matter of M-A-M-, which expanded the 
scope of procedural safeguards provided by federal statute.151  M-
A-M- provided guidance on: (1) when an immigration judge 
should make competency determinations; (2) what factors the 
immigration judge should consider and what procedures should 
be employed to make those determinations; and (3) what 
additional safeguards an immigration judge should prescribe to 
ensure that proceedings are sufficiently fair when competency is 
not established.152  The Franco-Gonzalez court observed that 
these additional judicially imposed safeguards were insufficient 
because the majority of them were “left to the Immigration 
149 Based on a total of 441,00 detained aliens. See Immigration Enforcement 
Actions: 2014, 2014 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. ANN. REP. 1, http://www.dhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf. 
150 This undermines the presumption usually made that the adult to whom mail 
was addressed had read it. 
151 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 481–83 (B.I.A. 2011). 
152 Id. at 476. The potential additional procedural safeguards included 
continuing the removal proceeding to allow the noncitizen to obtain representation; 
waiving the respondent’s appearance; actively aiding in development of the record, 
including the examination and cross-examination of witnesses; and reserving appeal 
rights for the noncitizen. Id. at 483. 
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Judge’s discretion, and none guarantee that the incompetent 
alien may participate in his proceedings as fully as an individual 
who is not disabled.”153 
Likewise, the other prong of the Mathews second factor—the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards—was similarly not satisfied at the time of the Franco-
Gonzalez August 2010 complaint.  In April 2009, immigration 
judge Mimi Tsankov observed in a DOJ publication that the 
“[EOIR] has not yet issued policy memoranda establishing 
procedures for mentally incompetent respondents in removal 
proceedings.”154  The EOIR explicitly referenced Judge Tsankov’s 
article in an updated Immigration Judge Benchbook155 but failed 
to articulate new systemic procedural safeguards to address the 
deficiencies cited in Tsankov’s article.  The EOIR opted instead to 
“inform the Immigration Judge’s decision-making process in this 
context by highlighting relevant authority and persuasive 
references, by suggesting best practices, and by offering links to 
external reference tools.”156 
Efforts by advocacy organizations to urge the Attorney 
General to develop additional procedural safeguards were also 
unsuccessful.  In July 2009, approximately sixty organizations 
and individuals wrote to Attorney General Holder identifying the 
problems facing noncitizens with mental disabilities in 
immigration proceedings and outlining proposed modifications in 
regulations and immigration court practices.  Among the 
proposed changes were: (1) appointment of counsel to all persons 
with mental disabilities; (2) appointment of guardians ad litem—
in addition to appointed counsel; (3) revision of existing 
regulations and the adoption of new regulations to standardize 
immigration proceedings; and (4) the provision of training 
153 Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 
3674492, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). 
154 Mimi E. Tsankov, Incompetent Respondents in Removal Proceedings, 3 
IMMIGR. L. ADVSIOR 1, 2 (2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/ 
2009/07/24/vol3no4.pdf. 
155 The Immigration Judge Benchbook is a tool published by the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review for use by immigration judges to assist in the 
adjudication of immigration cases. 
156 Immigration Judge Benchbook: Mental Health Issues, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-judge-benchbook-mental-health-issues (last 
updated Feb. 5, 2015). 
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programs and materials to all immigration judges.157  The letter 
requested that the Attorney General utilize his statutory 
authority to prescribe the proposed safeguards.  As of the date of 
Franco-Gonzalez’s complaint, the Attorney General had failed to 
provide any further safeguards.158 
That is not to say that the Attorney General neglected to 
take any action to address the lack of adequate procedural 
safeguards.  In October 2009, the EOIR reported that it had 
begun to lead training sessions for EOIR legal staff specifically 
focused on handling cases involving individuals with mental 
disabilities.159  The EOIR also began to develop standards of 
competence in removal proceedings and through its Legal 
Orientation and Pro Bono program began to explore how it might 
identify individuals with possible mental disabilities for referral 
to pro bono services.160  Concurrently, the DHS also began to 
evaluate potential additional procedures to protect the rights of 
detained respondents with mental disabilities.  The DHS issued a 
report in late 2009 noting the need for improvements in 
identifying and meeting the needs of mentally disabled detainees 
and recommending that “ICE should develop specialized 
caseloads of aliens including those who are chronically, 
medically, or mentally ill or have been detained a significant 
length of time to improve case management and expedite 
removal, release or relief.”161  However, all of these efforts 
remained in their preliminary stages and no additional 
procedural safeguards were implemented by the time the Franco-
Gonzalez complaint was filed.162 
157 Letter from Merrill Rotter, Dir., Div. of Law & Psychiatry, Albert Einstein 
Coll. of Medicine et al., to The Hon. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the U.S. (July 24, 
2009), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Letter%20to%20AG%20Hol 
der%20_Mental%20Health.pdf. 
158 Third Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at ¶¶ 128-129, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 
No. CV 10-2211 DMG (DTB), 2011 WL 12677104 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011). 
159 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AILA-EOIR LIAISON MEETING AGENDA QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS, 2–3 (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/eoiraila1028 
09.pdf.
160 Id.
161 Dr. Dora Schirro, Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations,
U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. 22 (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/ 
offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf. 
162 On April 22, 2013, the day before the Franco-Gonzalez order was issued, both 
the EOIR and the ICE issued guidance detailing additional procedural safeguards 
for noncitizens with competency issues in removal proceedings. The new EOIR 
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3. Mathews Factor No. 3: The Government’s Interest
The third Mathews factor calls for an assessment of the
government’s interest in using the current procedures rather 
than additional or different procedures.  The Plasencia Court 
recognized that this countervailing interest was also a “weighty” 
one.163  On its face, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s constitutional claim 
requiring that the government provide appointed counsel to all 
class members of detained noncitizens with mental disabilities 
appears prohibitively expensive.  However, when 
counterbalancing fiscal savings and administrative benefits are 
taken into account, the relative weight of the government’s 
interest is substantially diminished. 
The most significant fiscal savings that would accrue under a 
regime of appointed counsel result from the reduction in 
detention costs.  Recent data indicates that during FY 2014 the 
daily cost to taxpayers per immigrant detainee averaged $160, 
representing a total annual detention expense of $1.8 billion.164  
The DHS’s budget request for FY 2015 increased this expense to 
$2.4 billion.165  A major factor driving the expenditures on 
immigration detention is the privatization of detention facilities. 
Two private prison companies, Corrections Corporation of 
procedures included mental competency hearings, mental competency examinations, 
and the appointment of counsel. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review, Department of Justice and the Departmentt of Homeland 
Security Announce Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with 
Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
pr/department-justice-and-department-homeland-security-announce-safeguards-un 
represented. The ICE memo outlined new procedures for identification and 
assessment for detainees with mental capacity deficits. Memorandum from John 
Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigrations & Customs Enf’t, to Thomas D. Homan, Acting 
Exec. Assoc. Dir., Enf’t & Removal Operations, et. al. (April 22, 2013), http://www. 
ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/11063.1_current_id_and_infosharing_detainess_ 
mental_disorders.pdf. 
163 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). 
164 See The Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for Immigration 
Detention Do Not Add Up to Sensible Policies, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. 1–2 (Aug. 2013), 
https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Math-of-Immigation-
Detention-August-2013-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Math] (finding that the average cost 
per day per immigrant detainee was $159 in FY 2014); see also, Immigration 
Detention: How Can the Government Cut Costs?, HUM. RTS. FIRST (last updated Jan. 
2014), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/immigration-detention-how-can-gov 
ernment-cut-costs (finding the average per detainee cost was $164 per day). 
165 Joshua Breisblatt, The President’s FY 2016 Budget, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Feb. 6, 
2015), https://immigrationforum.org/blog/the-presidents-fy-2016-budget-department-
homeland-security. 
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America and Geo Group, Inc., dominate the immigration 
detention market and together account for as much as seventy-
two percent of the privately contracted ICE immigrant detention 
beds.166  These companies are powerful advocates for policies that 
promote and perpetuate mass incarceration of noncitizens in 
removal proceedings.167  Over the span of Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s 
nearly five-year detention, the government spent approximately 
$300,000 to imprison him.  The cost of appointing counsel for Mr. 
Franco-Gonzalez would have been a fraction of the detention 
expense. 
It is unlikely, however, that any procedural safeguard 
requiring the appointment of counsel would require that the 
government bear the full expense of representing all indigent 
respondents.  There already exists a significant network of 
nonprofit organizations that provide pro bono representation.  In 
fact, an integral part of the procedural due process presently 
afforded to unrepresented respondents, albeit weak, is the 
provision of a list of pro bono providers in the relevant 
jurisdiction.168  Thus, a procedural safeguard involving the 
appointment of counsel would require the government to serve as 
a backstop for those noncitizens unable to procure counsel on 
their own. 
Additional benefit from appointment of counsel to mentally 
disabled detainees would arise from reduced administrative 
costs.  The immigration courts are hopelessly clogged: as of 
November 2015, there were 463,000 pending cases, yielding on 
166 Bethany Carson & Eleana Diaz, Payoff: How Congress Ensures Private 
Prison Profit with an Immigrant Detention Quota, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP (Apr. 
2015), http://grassrootsleadership.org/reports/payoff-how-congress-ensures-private-
prison-profit-immigrant-detention-quota. 
167 See, e.g., Gaming the System: How the Political Strategies of Private Prison 
Companies Promote Ineffective Incarceration Policies, JUST. POL’Y INST. (June 2011), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf 
(discussing the private-prison industry’s three-pronged approach to increase profits 
through political influence: lobbying, direct campaign contributions, and building 
relationships and networks.). 
168 One of the purposes of the master calendar hearing is to “advise the 
respondent of the availability of free and low-cost legal service providers and provide 
the respondent with a list of such providers in the area where the hearing is being 
conducted.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 67 
(2009). 
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average a wait of nearly twenty-two months for case resolution.169  
More complicated cases like asylum have substantially longer 
wait times.  Providing counsel to unrepresented noncitizens 
would speed dockets by increasing the likelihood that the 
respondent is adequately prepared to proceed with his or her 
removal proceeding.170  The appointment of counsel would also 
reduce the number of requests for continuances since 
immigration judges routinely grant such requests to 
unrepresented persons to give them more time to find counsel.171  
Moreover, appointed counsel would provide courts with the 
additional benefit of reducing frivolous claims inasmuch as 
counsel would be barred from knowingly participating in such 
claims.172  Finally, being represented by counsel is positively 
correlated with appearance rates: “children who are represented 
have a much higher appearance rate in immigration court, 
92.5%, versus 27.5% for unrepresented children.”173 
Arguably, the rate of immigration detention—and its 
associated expense—may be on the wane and this could 
strengthen the government’s interest in the use of current 
procedures.  The sharp backlash against family detention in 
response to the 2014-2015 border surge has prompted the faster 
release of detainees.174  Alternatives to detention—for example, 
169 Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in 
Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_ 
backlog (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
170 See LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND 
TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 56 (2012), https://www.acus. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/Enhancing-Quality-and-Timeliness-in-Immigration 
-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf (finding that among a sample of 166
immigration judges ninety-two-percent agreed with the following statement: “When
the respondent has a competent lawyer, I can conduct the adjudication more
efficiently and quickly”).
171 See Immigration Judge Benchbook: Introduction to the Master Calendar, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. 15, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/ 
Purpose_and_History_of_MC.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2017) (“If the respondent 
states that he or she wishes to have a lawyer, the judge must then continue the 
hearing to another master calendar date to afford him or her time to find counsel.”). 
172 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20 (2016) (“[A]n asylum application is frivolous if any of its 
material elements is deliberately fabricated.”). 
173 A Humanitarian Call to Action: Unaccompanied Children in Removal 
Proceedings, ABA COMM’N IMMGR. 1 (May 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/cont 
ent/dam/aba/administrative/immigration/uacstatement.authcheckdam.pdf. 
174 Julia Preston, Judge Orders Release of Immigrant Children Detained by 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/us/detained-
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ankle bracelets and other monitoring devices, in-person 
reporting, home visits, etc.—have become increasingly 
prevalent.175  Some have argued that certain alternatives to 
detention, specifically ankle bracelets or “grilletes,” are not a true 
alternative to detention but rather another means to harass 
migrants and to further discourage migration.176  Nonetheless, 
the reliance on these devices serves to drive down the overall cost 
of detention, lessening the counterbalancing fiscal savings of 
appointed counsel for detained mentally disabled noncitizens. 
Even assuming an increase in the relative cost of appointed 
counsel as the countervailing fiscal savings decline, a dramatic 
change in the strength of the government’s interest would not 
necessarily be outcome determinative in a Mathews balancing 
test.  Several commentators have observed that “legal interests 
cannot be translated into common currency for comparison.”177  
That is, the nature of the respective interests do not lend 
themselves to linear quantitative analysis and “the cost of 
protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial.”178  
The Mathews Court found that “[f]inancial cost alone is not a 
controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a 
particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative 
decision.”179  Similarly, in Lassiter, the Court found that though 
the government’s “pecuniary interest is legitimate,” it could not 
overcome “private interests as important as [the termination of 
parental rights].”180  A similar argument could be framed using 
systems change theory to argue that, as a complex adaptive 
system, the current immigration enforcement paradigm distorts 
immigrant-children-judge-dolly-gee-ruling.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-share&smprod= 
nytcore-ipad. 
175 ICE has significantly increased the size of the ATD programs. Between FY 
2012 and FY 2013, enrollment of participants in ATD programs increased twenty-
eight percent. Math, supra note 164, at 10. 
176 Marlon Bishop, Why Are Immigrant Mothers Wearing Ankle Monitors?, 
LATINO USA (Oct. 23, 2015), www.latinousa.org/2015/10/23/why-are-immigrant-mot 
hers-wearing-ankle-monitors. 
177 Christopher J. Schmidt, Ending the Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test: 
Time for a New Due Process Test, 38 SW. L. REV. 287, 290 (2008) (quoting T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 
973 (1987)); see also Linda Kelly Hill, The Right To Be Heard: Voicing the Due 
Process Right to Counsel for Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 41, 65–68 (2011).
178 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977).
179 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). 
180 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981). 
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the operation of the system by focusing on a limited number of 
quantifiable targets: removals and fiscal savings.181  These 
specific targets can encapsulate only a few elements of our 
complex social organization, and their dominance is likely to 
undermine other aspects of the organization that are crucial to 
its general and long-term welfare, such as economic productivity, 
family unity, and community cohesion.182 
Consequently, the private interest at stake for Mr. Franco-
Gonzalez—that is, his physical liberty—was sufficient to 
overcome the government’s financial interest in using the current 
procedures. 
4. Turner Conditions: Asymmetry of Representation and
Complexity of Immigration Law
The central holding of Turner—that there is no categorical
right to appointed counsel in civil proceedings that may result in 
a deprivation of liberty—is constrained by two conditions that 
are emblematic of immigration law: asymmetrical legal 
representation and a relatively complex body of law.  Both of 
these limiting conditions were present in Mr. Franco-Gonzalez’s 
case and thus support the argument for the appointment of 
counsel. 
The government is always represented in immigration 
proceedings, but nearly eighty-five percent of detained 
noncitizens appear pro se.183  This imbalance in representation 
yields dramatic differences in outcomes for respondents who 
appear in immigration court without counsel.  Mr. Franco-
Gonzalez’s relative disadvantage in appearing unrepresented is 
significantly compounded by the nature of his mental disability. 
His limited mental acuity would impede his ability to ably 
represent himself and would further exacerbate the inequity that 
Turner sought to avoid.  On his own, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez had 
little chance of ever finding a lawyer: his inability to even dial a 
telephone prevented him from availing himself of the list of pro 
bono attorneys provided to him by the immigration judge.184 
181 See JAKE CHAPMAN, SYSTEMS FAILURE: WHY GOVERNMENTS MUST LEARN TO 
THINK DIFFERENTLY 51–64 (2d ed. 2004). 
182 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 2405. 
183 Siulic et al., supra note 104; see discussion supra Section II.A. 
184 Cindy Chang, Mentally Disabled Facing Deportation Win Legal Right to Free 
Legal Help, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/25/local/ 
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Similarly, the unusually complex nature of immigration law, 
placed Mr. Franco-Gonzalez squarely outside the scope of the 
Turner holding.185  Moreover, the basis for the government’s 
charge of removability against Mr. Franco-Gonzalez was 
grounded in his conviction for an aggravated felony.  The 
commission of an aggravated felony serves as a bar to most forms 
of immigration relief and could mandate mandatory removal. 
However, determining whether a particular crime is an 
aggravated felony is a formidable challenge.186  The increasingly 
tangled skein of “cr-immigration” law—the nexus of criminal and 
immigration law—has required that the Supreme Court address 
no less than three times in seven years whether certain low-level 
crimes constitute aggravated felonies.187 
Under Turner, the unusual complexity of immigration law 
leads to the conclusion that a respondent in Mr. Franco-
Gonzalez’s position “can fairly be represented only by a trained 
advocate.”188 
D. Tallying the Mathews Factors and Turner Conditions
In the aggregate, under a due process analytical framework
based on the three-factor Mathews v. Eldridge test and updated 
for the two limiting conditions in Turner v. Rogers, had the 
Franco-Gonzalez court reached the certified class’s constitutional 
claim, it would have arrived at the same conclusion as when it 
decided the “reasonable accommodation” claim:  Indigent 
mentally disabled immigrants in removal proceedings are 
categorically eligible for appointed counsel.  It has been 
demonstrated that the plaintiffs’ private interest at stake—
Mathews factor No. 1—and the risk of erroneous deprivation—
Mathews factor No. 2—outweigh the government’s interest in the 
current procedures—Mathews factor No. 3.  Further, the two 
conditions that expressly limited the Turner ruling—the 
la-me-ln-mentally-disabled-immigrants-ruling-20130425 (stating that Franco-
Gonzalez “doesn’t know how to use a telephone”). 
185 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
186 In his concurrence to Padilla, Justice Alito noted that because of the 
increased complexity of aggravated felony law, the ABA’s Guidebook on Immigration 
Law devoted a new thirty–page chapter to the topic . Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
356, 378 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
187 Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2013). 
188 Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 449 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778, 788 (1973)). 
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asymmetry in representation and the complexity of the 
proceedings—are conspicuously present in immigration 
proceedings.  Thus, the Franco-Gonzalez class members would 
have prevailed in their constitutional claim for a categorical right 
to appointed counsel. 
III. EXTENDING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO DETAINED
WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
The analytical framework that supports Mr. Franco-
Gonzalez’s constitutional claim also furthers the argument that 
other vulnerable groups in immigration removal proceedings 
have a right to appointed counsel. 
In the broadest sense, under this framework, arguably all 
indigent undocumented persons in removal proceeding have a 
per se right to appointed counsel.  That is, the balancing of the 
Mathews factors supplemented by the Turner conditions results 
in the categorical right to appointed counsel for all indigent 
noncitizens: (1) the United States Supreme Court has recognized 
the relative—“weighty”189—importance of the private interest at 
stake for individuals facing removal;190 (2) the risk of erroneous 
deprivation is high given the huge backlogs in immigration court 
and current docket management practices; (3) the potential for 
significant fiscal savings and other administrative benefits 
diminish the government’s interest in the current procedures; 
and (4) the conditions that limited the Turner holding—the 
asymmetry in representation and the complexity of the body of 
law—are ever present in the case of indigent noncitizens facing 
removal. 
Due process is, however, an elastic concept that is dependent 
upon the circumstances.191  Under an appropriately individuated 
approach, certain circumstances may compel an even more 
pressing need for augmented procedural due process safeguards. 
This section argues, using the Mathews factors supplemented by 
189 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). 
190 Deportation “may . . . visit as great a hardship as the deprivation of the right 
to pursue a vocation or a calling.” Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147. 
191 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (noting that “due process 
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands”); see also Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (internal quotation mark omitted) (underscoring that “[d]ue 
process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place and circumstances”). 
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Turner, that women and children detained as part of the 2014-
2015 “border surge,” like Marisol and Jennifer, have a 
heightened need for the enhanced procedural safeguard provided 
by appointed counsel. 
A. The Southwestern Border Surge and Family Detention
In fleeing to the United States, Marisol and her daughter
Jennifer became part of the phenomenon known as the “border 
surge” that occurred along the southwestern border beginning in 
late 2013.  Comprised of unaccompanied children and “family 
units”192—primarily mothers and their children—mostly from 
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, these individuals sought 
to escape increased lawlessness in their homelands.  The root 
causes of this migration have been variably identified as 
domestic abuse,193 gang violence,194 and political and social 
instability.195  The term “surge” is an apt descriptor, as in fiscal 
year 2014, the number of family unit apprehensions nearly 
quadrupled.196 
To address this influx, the federal government reversed its 
policy on family detention and opened new facilities to 
incarcerate these vulnerable women and children in New Mexico 
and Texas.  The turnabout was surprising, as just five years 
earlier, the Obama Administration announced its decision to 
discontinue the practice of detaining families and shut down the 
notorious T. Don Hutto facility.197  Regarding the newly opened 
192 CBP defines a “family unit” as representing “individuals—either a child 
under 18 years old, parent or legal guardian—apprehended with a family member by 
the U.S. Border Patrol.” United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject 
and Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016, U.S. CUSTOMS 
& BORDER PROT. (Oct. 18, 2016), http://cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-un 
accompanied-children/fy-2016. 
193 Mónica Ramírez & Anne K. Ream, Migrant Children Are Fleeing a Region 
Rife with Sexual Violence, NEW REPUBLIC (July 23, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/ 
article/118820/sexual-violence-major-cause-immigration-us. 
194 No Childhood Here: Why Central American Children Are Fleeing Their 




196 Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children FY 2014, U.S. CUSTOMS & 
BORDER PROT. (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-bor 
der-unaccompanied-children/fy-2014. 
197 2009 Immigration Detention Reforms, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Dec. 12, 
2011), https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/2009detention-reform. 
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facilities, the Secretary of Homeland Security acknowledged that 
the change in policy was part of an aggressive deterrence 
strategy designed to create such inhospitable conditions that 
others would be dissuaded from following.  At the inauguration of 
the 400-bed detention facility in Dilley, Texas, DHS Secretary 
Jeh Johnson warned families without legal papers considering 
coming to the United States that “[i]t will now be more likely 
that you will be detained and sent back.”198 
As part of the general deterrence effort, advocates alleged 
that ICE officials were instructed to enforce a blanket no-release 
policy even though the families had passed credible fear 
screenings.199  The no-release policy represented a significant 
departure from the traditional process whereby the ICE 
generally did not detain families found to have a credible fear of 
persecution; rather, after an individualized assessment of 
primarily two factors—their flight risk and danger to the 
community—the majority of these families were routinely either 
set free on bond or on their own recognizance.200  In early 2015, 
the general deterrence policy was litigated in R.I.L-R. v. Johnson.  
The District Court for the District of Columbia issued a 
preliminary injunction halting the DHS’s newly formulated 
policy.  The court found that the deterrence of mass migration as 
a factor in custody determinations “is likely unlawful, and that 
the policy causes irreparable harm.”201  Quoting Zadvydas, the 
court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 
that ‘[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 
detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart 
of the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process] Clause 
protects.’ ”202  Soon after the issuance of the preliminary 
injunction, DHS revised its policy such that it was ostensibly 
more consistent with long-standing practice.  The policy 
198 Julia Preston, Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-secur 
ity-chief-opens-largest-immigration-detention-center-in-us.html. 
199 R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 174 (D.D.C. 2015). 
200 Id. at 174–75. 
201 Id. at 191. 
202 Id. at 187 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)) (second 
alteration in original). 
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announcement indicated that ICE would “discontinue invoking 
general deterrence as a factor in custody determinations in all 
cases involving families.”203 
Meanwhile, conditions in the detention facilities in Artesia, 
New Mexico, Dilley, Texas, and Karnes, Texas were deplorable. 
A report issued by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 
a bipartisan agency established by Congress, cited frequent 
claims of sexual abuse upon detainees in ICE custody, coercive 
staff threats of physical harm, and separation of children from 
mothers who reported the dismal facility conditions, which 
included spoiled food, undrinkable water, and inadequate access 
to medical care. 204  A study by the Organization of American 
States found similar complaints and noted “inadequate and 
disproportionately restrictive conditions, akin to a penal 
incarceration center.”205  These conditions were reminiscent of 
the offenses that led to the shuttering of the infamous T. Don 
Hutto facility in 2009.206 
In addition to serving to deter other potential migrants, the 
newly revived detention policy also put pressure on the 
incarcerated women and children, some of whom had been jailed 
for months on end, to abandon their cases.  However, most 
women and children chose, like Marisol and Jennifer, to remain 
incarcerated rather than return to the persecution they had fled. 
After the issuance of the preliminary injunction in R.I.L-R and 
DHS’s subsequent abandonment of its no-release policy, detained 
families were finally given the opportunity to have their day in 
court to argue for their release from custodial detention. 
Through the efforts of pro bono networks, such as the AILA- 
203 ICE Announces Enhanced Oversight for Family Residential Centers, IMMGR. 
& CUSTOMS ENF’T (May 13, 2015), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-announces-
enhanced-oversight-family-residential-centers. 
204 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE 
STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AT U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 124–25 (2015), 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf. 
205 ORG. OF AM. STATES, REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
FAMILIES AND UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN 75–76 (2015), http://www.oas.org/en/iach 
r/reports/pdfs/Refugees-Migrants-US.pdf. 
206 Lawsuits Ask That Children and Their Families Be Released From Texas 
Facility Under Appropriate and Humane Supervision, ACLU (Mar. 6, 2007), https:// 
www.aclu.org/news/aclu-challenges-illegal-detention-immigrant-children-held-prison 
-conditions.
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CARA Pro Bono Defense Project, many families were represented 
at bond hearings.  However, the terms of the pro bono 
representation were often limited to only the bond hearing.207 
Consequently, once set free on bond or on their own 
recognizance, many families still faced the nearly 
insurmountable task of arguing their merit cases pro se. 
B. Detained Children
As a result of the current policy of family detention,
hundreds of children are currently detained with their mothers 
in facilities located primarily in the Southwest.  The Supreme 
Court visited the issue of additional due process safeguards to be 
afforded to juveniles in In re Gault.208  The Court held that 
minors in delinquency proceedings are entitled by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to a number of 
procedural safeguards, including the right to appointed counsel. 
Others have argued that Turner, when applied in conjunction 
with Gault, provides the basis for the right to appointed counsel 
in removal proceedings.209  This Article takes the approach of 
emphasizing the out-sized influences of the Turner limiting 
conditions in making the case for the appointment of counsel for 
detained children. 
The two Turner conditions interact to amplify the due 
process shortcomings for detained minors.  As with the plaintiff 
Franco-Gonzalez, detained minors operate under an incapacity. 
Their youth prevents them from fully appreciating the nature of 
the removal proceedings and inhibits their ability to adequately 
defend themselves in immigration court.  Without the assistance 
of effective counsel, the imbalance of power created by the 
asymmetry in representation is an insurmountable obstacle to a 
fundamentally fair proceeding.  The injustice contemplated in 
Turner is an always-binding limitation in the case of 
207 In recognition of the frequency with which representation is limited to only 
custody or bond proceedings, EOIR issued a new rule in late 2015 that for the first 
time allowed the entry of an appearance by an attorney or accredited representative 
before the Immigration Court for this limited purpose only. Permitting such 
separate appearances was designed to encourage legal representation of individuals 
who would otherwise appear pro se at their custody and bond proceedings. Separate 
Representation for Custody and Bond Proceedings, 80 Fed. Reg. 59500 (Oct. 1, 2015) 
(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17 (2017)). 
208 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967). 
209 See Devins, supra note 7, at 910. 
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unaccompanied children since, under the reasoning of Gagnon 
and Turner, a legal contest between a child and an adult can 
hardly be viewed as “fundamentally fair.”  Moreover, while the 
mental disability attributed to the Franco-Gonzalez plaintiffs 
could arguably be challenged, the nature of the incapacity of the 
unaccompanied minors is unequivocal.  Nor could this incapacity 
be overcome by treatment or medication. 
The injustice that arises from the lack of representation for 
detained children is intertwined with the second Turner limiting 
condition—the complexity of immigration law—as applied to 
minors.  There exists certain forms of relief from removal for 
minors that are uniquely complex.  One of these, Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”), grants legal status to 
qualifying minors who have been deemed abused, abandoned or 
neglected by one or both parents.210  By some estimates, as many 
as twenty-three percent of undocumented minors have a 
colorable claim for SIJS.211  A distinguishing feature of SIJS is 
that a minor who successfully petitions for this form of relief is 
precluded by statute from filing any immigrant petition for either 
parent.  Thus, a significant conflict of interest is embedded 
within SIJS: a detained mother may be reluctant to pursue this 
form of relief for her child since the mother would, if the petition 
was successful, thereby be cut off from any derivative claim of 
relief.  It would be in the mother’s self-interest to resist filing an 
SIJS claim for her child, but rather to pursue an asylum claim 
which would in most circumstances allow the mother to benefit 
from derivative status. 
The resulting conflict of interest raises the possibility that a 
detained child would elect, on his or her own, to pursue an SIJS 
claim.  This form of relief first requires a predicate special 
findings order of dependency by a state juvenile court.  For the 
unrepresented minor, this means navigating the state court 
proceedings where often no interpreter services are available. 
210 See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4) (2012) (allocating a percentage of immigrant visas 
to individuals considered “special immigrants”); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) 
(West 2014) (defining “Special Immigrant Juveniles”). 
211 Olga Byrne & Elise Miller, The Flow of Unaccompanied Children Through 
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The jurisdictional grounds for obtaining the predicate order are 
varied and could require, depending on the individual state, a 
petition for legal guardianship, child custody, juvenile 
delinquency proceedings, or child dependency proceedings.212  In 
some jurisdictions, the state court remains unfamiliar with or 
confused about its ability to grant special findings orders, posing 
yet another hurdle for the unrepresented minor.213 
Once having navigated the state juvenile court system, the 
unrepresented minor seeking SIJS relief would next need to 
follow a set of adjudication procedures involving the immigration 
court and USCIS.  The minor would appear before an 
immigration judge to seek a continuance while a petition for SIJS 
is filed with USCIS.  If USCIS approves the petition, the minor 
would return to immigration court to file an adjustment of status 
application with the immigration judge.  The judge could choose 
to terminate the removal proceedings upon USCIS’s approval of 
the petition, but he has the option to hold a full merits hearing 
on the application. 
Thus, in order to prevail in a claim for SIJS relief from 
removal, a minor must appear in two judicial settings—juvenile 
court and immigration court—in addition to filing a petition with 
USCIS.  The complexity of the process for SIJS relief, coupled 
with the crippling effect of a lack of representation, gives added 
weight to the limiting Turner conditions. 
C. Asylum Applicants
The majority of women and children detained as part of the
border surge strategy have filed applications for asylum. 
Undocumented persons in removal proceedings who raise an 
asylum defense have an elevated entitlement to appointed 
counsel under both the first factor of the Mathews test—the 
private interest at stake—and the second Turner factor—the 
complexity of the body of law. 
By definition, asylees face the risk of torture, persecution, or 
death if they are returned to their home countries.  Thus, the 
relative importance of Plasencia’s weighty private interest is 
212 Annie Chen, An Urgent Need: Unaccompanied Children and Access to 
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enhanced by the serious risk of harm that may befall 
unsuccessful asylum applicants who are removed.214  To 
illustrate, consider the case of Constantino Morales, a former 
police officer in Mexico who publicly stood up against drug 
trafficking, was denied asylum in the United States, and was 
shot to death within six months of being returned to Mexico.215  It 
is difficult to quantify the total number of unsuccessful asylum 
applicants who subsequently succumb to the persecution that 
initially caused them to flee since no United States government 
agency tracks the status of rejected asylum applicants after their 
removal.  However, recent research compiled from local 
newspaper reports in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador 
suggests that at least eighty-three deportees from the United 
States have been murdered upon their return to Central America 
since January 2014.216 
Moreover, keeping in mind the individuated nature of 
procedural due process, the right to appointed counsel is even 
stronger for those asylum applicants who have passed their 
credible fear interview, the first threshold test of a successful 
asylum claim.  The claims of these individuals have been 
screened by a trained asylum officer who has concluded that 
there exists “a significant possibility . . . that the alien could 
establish eligibility for asylum under [§] 1158 [of the INA].”217 
The second Turner factor—the complexity of the body of law 
at issue—is implicated in the case of asylum seekers, in part, 
because of the “unequivocal chasm”218 in the consistency of 
certain asylum adjudications.  Fundamentally inconsistent 
interpretations of elemental terms create a confusing body of 
214 Pitsker, supra note 6, at 188 (noting that “[t]he private interest in avoiding 
the general hardship of deportation is magnified exponentially in the case of an 
asylum seeker, who may face persecution, torture, or death if returned to his 
country”). 
215 MacKenzie Elmer, Brother of Slain Deported Man: ‘We Fought to Keep Him 
Here,’ DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 10 2015, 11:39 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister. 
com/story/news/2015/04/10/constantino-morales-roque-deported-mexico-killed/25615 
303. 
216 Sibylla Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, US Government Deporting Central 
American Migrants to Their Death, GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015, 08:57), https://www. 
theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-deportations-central-amer 
ica. 
217 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2012). 
218 Scott Rempell, Asylum Discord: Disparities in Persecution Assessments, 15 
NEV. L.J. 142, 148 (2014). 
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jurisprudence that only a trained advocate can decipher.  For 
example, a recent study of the inconsistencies in the 
interpretation of the term “persecution”—the bedrock 
requirement for a viable asylum claim—found: 
[In the Ninth Circuit,] a one-day detention involving electric 
shock compelled a finding of persecution, while [in the First 
Circuit,] a ten-day detention involving electric shock did not. 
Similarly, while [in the Seventh Circuit,] several weeks of 
psychological suffering necessarily established persecution,
several years of even greater psychological suffering failed to 
cross the persecution threshold [in the Ninth Circuit].219 
In addition to inter-circuit disparities, the lack of a uniform 
persecution standard has given rise to significant disparities in 
intra-circuit interpretations of the term resulting in wildly 
divergent grant rates by immigration judges within the same 
jurisdiction.220 
In light of the complexity of asylum law, where even basic 
terms are unpredictably interpreted, it is no surprise that there 
is a stark disparity in legal outcomes for unrepresented women 
and children who were part of the 2014-2015 border surge. 
“[T]he single most important factor in determining [legal] 
outcomes is whether or not these individuals are represented in 
their court proceedings.”221  Recent data suggests that detained 
women and children almost never prevail if they appear without 
representation—only 2.3% were granted asylum; however, 
women with children who appeared with representation 
benefitted from a 32.9% success rate, representing a more than 
fourteen-fold increase in the likelihood that they would be 
permitted to stay.222 
Further, several empirical studies have concluded that 
evidence of credible fear of persecution and human rights 
conditions in the homeland country are not necessarily the most 
important factors assessed in an asylum claim.  Rather, such 
unrelated factors as the judge’s gender and prior work 
experience, as well as the asylum-applicant’s gender, educational 
219 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
220 Id. at 192. 
221 Representation Makes Fourteen-Fold Difference in Outcome: Immigration 
Court “Women with Children” Cases, TRAC IMMIGR. (July 15, 2015), http://trac.syr. 
edu/immigration/reports/396. 
222 Id. 
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level, and religion have a significant effect on outcomes.223  The 
resulting lack of consistent asylum adjudications further 
complicates an already complex body of law and underscores the 
heightened need for appointed counsel for indigent asylum 
applicants facing removal. 
Another dimension to the asylum application process that 
creates an urgent need for appointed counsel is the statutory 
provision, which requires that any asylum claim must be brought 
within one year of the noncitizen’s entry into the United 
States.224  Asylum claims made after the one-year deadline are 
time barred unless the noncitizen demonstrates “either the 
existence of changed circumstances which materially affect 
eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to 
the delay in filing a[] [timely] application.”225  Moreover, a 
subsequent asylum application that presents a previously 
unraised basis for relief will be deemed to be a new application.226  
In the absence of changed or extraordinary circumstances, the 
filing date of the subsequent asylum application will control for 
the purposes of determining whether the one-year time bar 
applies.227  While this Article does not argue for the appointment 
of counsel before any asylum claim is filed, the assistance of 
counsel is required to overcome the one-year time bar in those 
situations after changed or extraordinary circumstances have 
occurred. 
An obvious peril in the provision of counsel to detained 
families seeking asylum is that the policy would prove to be 
perfunctory or token.  Attorneys representing women and 
children detained at the Dilley and Karnes facilities have 
complained that ICE has prevented them from accompanying 
their clients to compulsory meetings where the clients are forced 
to make decisions and potentially forfeit rights without 
counsel.228  Attorneys have also on occasion been barred from 
223 Linda Camp Keith & Jennifer S. Holmes, A Rare Examination of Typically 
Unobservable Factors in US Asylum Decisions, 22 J. REFUGEE STUD. 224, 228, 240 
(2009). 
224 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
225 § 1158(a)(2)(D). 
226 M-A-F-, 26 I & N Dec. 651, 665 (B.I.A. 2015). 
227 Id. at 656–57. 
228 Olga Byrne & Eleanor Acer, Family Detention: Still Happening, Still 
Damaging, HUM. RTS. FIRST 3–4 (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/ 
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even entering the facilities to serve their clients.229  Other 
troubling reports have highlighted DHS’s propensity to transfer 
represented mothers and children away from counsel, sometimes 
without any or meaningful notice, and disregarding pending or 
scheduled requests for reconsideration and other ongoing legal 
processes.230  A successful policy requiring the appointment of 
counsel for detained women and children would require the 
cessation of governmental procedures that impede effective 
representation. 
CONCLUSION 
The noble intent underpinning Gideon’s promise has not 
been expanded to encompass immigration proceedings.  There 
exists no recognized categorical right to appointed counsel for 
noncitizens appearing in immigration court, with the limited 
exception carved out in the landmark Franco-Gonzalez case.  The 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provided the basis for the Franco-
Gonzalez order that counsel be appointed for noncitizens with 
mental disabilities who are facing removal.  In an act of 
constitutional avoidance, the court did not reach the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional claim. 
This Article demonstrates that had the Franco-Gonzalez 
court engaged in the constitutional inquiry, the same categorical 
right to appointed counsel would have resulted under an analysis 
that incorporates recent developments in due process 
jurisprudence.  The two conditions that limited the Turner 
holding—asymmetrical legal representation and complexity of 
the law at issue—are ever present in removal proceedings.  The 
extraordinary hardship imposed by banishment inexorably leads 
to the conclusion that appointed counsel is required to ensure 
procedural due process.  For detained women and children 
fleeing persecution in their homeland the stakes are even higher: 
removal may amount to a death sentence.  While the costs 
associated with providing counsel are not insubstantial, they are 
mitigated by lowered detention and administrative costs.  In the 
final analysis, however, financial considerations should not be 
229 Id. 
230 Letter from Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n et al., to Leon Rodriguez, Dir., 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., and Sarah Saldana, Dir., Immigration and 
Customs Enf’t (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-correspondence/ 
2015/letter-uscis-ice-due-process. 
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the determining factor.  Constitutional rights cannot be 
translated into common currency.  Assuring the fundamental 
fairness of immigration proceedings by appointing counsel to the 
unrepresented would provide new breath to Gideon’s clarion call 
for justice. 
